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1. Introduction 
 
Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, organised networks have 
spread across borders in the Middle-East, overtaking cities. The most famous 
of these is the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (“ISIL”), more 
commonly known as the “Islamic State” (IS).1 The jihadist group announced 
the establishment of a Caliphate or “Islamic State,” claiming exclusive 
political and theological authority over the world’s Muslims. Militants of the 
IS now control wide portions of territory in Iraq and Syria as well as a 
territory in Libya.2 The IS has killed and injured thousands of people and the 
IS-related violence has led to the displacement of over a million people. 
Atrocities committed or inspired by the IS have extended to the Middle-East, 
Africa, Europe, and Asia.3  
      The IS possesses a governmental authority, whose efficiency is ensured 
by a law enforcement agency and a judicial system. In addition, it has its 
own financial and economic resources, coming in particular from the sale of 
oil and extortion.4 However, the IS exercises its power over a territory whose 
borders are regularly moving, depending on the military successes of the 
coalition engaged in a conflict against that organization.5 It is doubtful 
whether the territory of the IS is steady enough in order to be considered as a 
State territory.6 In any case, since the IS has acquired its territory through an 
illegal use of armed force and, more generally, rejects the rules of the 
international legal order, it should not – and is not – recognised as a State.7 
An entity whose statehood is not recognised by any State, cannot emerge as 
a State in the international legal order. There is a general consensus in the 
international community that the IS is a terrorist organization.8  
      In response to attacks of the IS, Iraq asked in June 2014 for international 
assistance in its fight against the organization in Iraq.9 Then, in September 
2014, Iraq requested the United States and its allies to assist it in defending 
itself against the group also in Syria. It noted that the IS had established a 
safe haven outside Iraq that provided the group an ability “to train for, plan, 
finance and carry out terrorist operations across our borders.” For these 
reasons, Iraq asked the United States to “lead international efforts to strike 
ISIL sites and military strongholds, with our express consent.”10 This request 
was the doorway through which the United States and other States alleged a 
right to assist Iraq in its fight against the IS in Iraq and/or Syria. In August 
2014, the United States launched airstrikes against the IS in Iraq and, in 
September 2014, expanded its military intervention against the organization 
in Syria. At the same time, it declared airstrikes against the Khorasan Group 
in Syria, a group which is composed by al-Qaeda elements.11 Bahrain, Qatar, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates immediately participated 
in the United States-led airstrikes against the IS in Syria. Canada, Turkey, 
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Australia, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Norway joined the coalition later.12 While some of those States 
participate in the airstrikes against the IS in Iraq and/or Syria, such as in 
particular the UK and France, others simply provide military assistance, like 
Germany.13 64 States and 2 international organizations are militarily involved 
against the IS in Iraq.14 Only 16 States are involved in the military action 
against the IS in Syria. The difference in the number of States implicated in 
the fight against the IS in Iraq and Syria is due to the fact that, while the 
legality of the military involvement is overall uncontentious in Iraq, at least 
in the jus ad bellum aspect, it is not the case of the military involvement in 
Syria.  
      A State can request armed assistance from other States on its territory, in 
particular to defeat terrorist movements. Under international law, external 
military intervention by invitation is legal, except when its objective is to 
settle a civil war in favour of the established government.15 Consent by the 
territorial State to the resort to force by other States on its territory precludes 
the wrongfulness of the military intervention in relation to the intervening 
State(s).16 Only the effective authorities of the State have the lawful authority 
to consent and the consent must be given prior to the use of force, clear as 
well as free. The host State is entitled to set limits, in particular concerning 
the duration or the location of the State’s use of force.17 The lawful 
government of Iraq explicitly and freely asked for military support in its fight 
against the IS on its territory. Thus, military involvement of States in Iraq 
against the IS since September 2014, with the consent of that latter State, is 
legal. 
      Unlike Iraq, Syria has not given its agreement to the military intervention 
of Iraq, the United States and several other States against the IS on its 
territory. On the contrary, Syria objected to the United States-led military 
action against the IS within its territorial confines, done without its approval, 
qualifying it as “a violation of Syrian sovereignty.”18 Russia too has been 
perpetrating strikes in Syria since September 2015 but these happen at the 
explicit and free request of the Syrian President, al-Assad.19 The regime of 
al-Assad can be regarded as the most effective authority in Syria, able to 
represent the Syrian State, nationally and internationally, contrary to the 
Syrian National Coalition. This regime is thus the government of Syria.20 
Iran has also sent troops into Syria with the agreement of al-Assad.21 
Russia’s and Iran’s military actions in Syria are thus based on the consent of 
that latter State and therefore legal, at least as long as they are directed 
against the IS and not against the opposition of the regime of al-Assad. 
      There are two clear exceptions to the international prohibition on the use 
of armed force between States: the use of force authorised by the UN 
Security Council, and the use of force within the right to self-defence. The 
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UN Security Council can, on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
authorise States to resort to armed force against a State or non-State actor 
whose conduct is qualified as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act 
of aggression. It is common practice that the Security Council delegates the 
use of force to States in authorising them to use all necessary measures or all 
necessary means.22 Following the terrorist attacks in Paris and Saint-Denis 
on 13th November 2015, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2249. It 
condemned a series of terrorist attacks by the IS, including those in France, 
and qualified the IS and other terrorist groups as “a global and unprecedented 
threat to international peace and security.”23 Although Resolution 2249 does 
not explicitly refer to Chapter VII, this does not necessarily mean that it is 
not to be understood as binding, as stated by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ).24 The resolution called upon “Member States that have the 
capacity to do so to take all necessary measures” in order, in particular, to 
eradicate the safe havens those terrorist groups have established over Iraq 
and Syria.25 The verb “calls upon” could be understood as an authorisation.26 
The drafting history of resolution 2249 indicates however that the Security 
Council members did not want to adopt any binding resolution which 
authorised a military action. Based on an analysis of the text of resolution 
2249 that differs from classical resolutions delegating the recourse to force, 
and on a reading of the debate having preceded its adoption, one can 
conclude that resolution 2249 did not confer a right to Member States they 
did not otherwise already have and did not authorise them to use force 
against the IS.  
      The other exception to the prohibition on the resort to inter-State armed 
force is the use of force within the right to self-defence, as recognised by the 
UN Charter (Article 51) and customary international law, in reaction to an 
armed attack. An action in self-defence can be individual, when the victim 
State reacts to an armed attack, or collective, when other States react to an 
armed attack on the request of the victim State. Not all States intervening in 
Syria gave a justification for their military action against the IS. Surprisingly, 
if Iraq sent two letters to the UN Security Council informing it about its 
military action against the IS, including in Syria, it did not refer to self-
defence or to Article 51 of the UN Charter. Iraq only mentioned that 
“ISIL has repeatedly launched attacks against Iraqi territory from eastern 
Syria.”27 Since however Iraq followed the obligation to report self-defence 
responses to the Security Council, as established by Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, it is here argued that Iraq implicitly justified its forcible action in 
Syria under the right to self-defence. The United States, Canada, and Turkey 
invoked the right to collective self-defence of Iraq as well as their right 
to individual self-defence,28 whereas Australia only invoked the right to 
collective self-defence of Iraq.29 France began its military intervention in 
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Syria in September 2015 on the basis of its right to collective self-defence of 
Iraq.30 After the terror attacks of the IS in Paris and Saint-Denis on 13th 
November 2015, France extended its strikes, on the ground of its right to 
individual self-defence and asked for assistance.31 Several western States 
decided then to be involved in the fight against the IS in Syria, invoking the 
right to self-defence. The United Kingdom relied on both the rights to 
individual and collective self-defence.32 Germany referred to the right to 
collective self-defence of States that had been subjected to armed attacks by 
the IS.33 Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway asserted that they 
were exercising collective self-defence of Iraq.34 Belgium claimed a right 
to collective self-defence of Iraq as well as of States that had been subjected 
to armed attacks by the IS.35  
      The conduct of the IS cannot be attributed to the al-Assad government 
and thus to Syria. Indeed, under international law, the conduct of a person 
or group of persons may be attributed to a State under six circumstances: if 
the entity is a de jure or de facto organ of the State;36 if it is empowered by 
that State to exercise governmental authority;37 if it is an organ of another 
State that has been placed at the disposal of the first State;38 where the 
acting entity did so under the instructions, direction or control of the 
government of the State;39 where the acting entity is “exercising elements of 
the government authority in the absence or default of the official authorities 
and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of 
authority;”40 if the conduct is acknowledged and adopted by the State as its 
own.41 None of these attribution’s criteria applies here. The IS is not an 
organ of Syria or of any other State; it has not been empowered by Syria in 
the exercise of governmental authority; it is acting independently from the 
Syrian State; furthermore, Syria objects to the operations of the IS, what 
prevents those operations being seen as elements of governmental authority 
in the default of the exercise of authority by the regular Syrian government 
on parts of the Syrian territory;42 finally, the IS’s conduct has not been 
acknowledged by Syria. In fact, the al-Assad government does not exercise 
any control over the IS and has been engaged for years in a fight against the 
group.43 Thus, the IS’s behaviour cannot be attributed to the Syrian State or 
to any other State. Furthermore, as stated above, the IS is not a State. 
Therefore, the IS must be seen as a non-State actor. 
      The right to self-defence is traditionally exercised by a State against 
another State. Hence, the question is raised of the legality of the action in 
self-defence by some States against the IS, a non-State actor, in Syria. In 
accordance with the UN Charter, the right to self-defence should be a 
response to an armed attack. The United States, Canada, Turkey, France, and 
the United Kingdom have however relied on their own right to individual 
self-defence in response to imminent armed attacks or even a simple 
 85 
threat of armed attacks by the IS. Thus, the question is raised on whether 
there is a new right to self-defence, under customary international law, in 
reaction to future armed attacks. This article aims to analyse whether the 
fight against the IS in Syria modified the material and temporal scopes of 
the customary right to self-defence. Four chapters will follow. Chapter 2 will 
argue that there was no right to self-defence against non-State actors before 
the Syrian conflict and will outline the arguments presented by some States 
in favour of a right to self-defence against the IS, a non-State actor. 
Chapter 3 will explain that, in contradiction with the traditional temporal 
understanding of the right to self-defence, some of the States intervening in 
Syria assert a right to react to imminent armed attacks or even to a 
simple threat of armed attacks committed by the IS. Chapter 4 will show 
the limited international acceptance of a broad right to self-defence as a 
justification for the military involvement in Syria. Finally, the last chapter 
will conclude that neither a right to self-defence against non-State actors, 
nor a right to self-defence in reaction to armed attacks whose occurrence is 
not certain, has crystallised in customary international law. The paper 
acknowledges however that the military operation against the IS in Syria 
constitutes another step towards the emergence of a customary right to self-
defence against non-State actors, including in reaction to future armed 
attacks, and argues that such a right should apply restrictively.  
 
2. An Action in Self-Defence against the IS as a Non-State Actor 
 
2.1. The Absence of a Right to Self-Defence against  
       Non-State Actors before the Fight against the IS 
 
The right to self-defence is guaranteed in Article 51 of the UN Charter as well 
as in customary international law.44 The bedrock principle of self-defence is 
that it may be invoked in response to an international armed attack. In its 
Nicaragua Judgment, the ICJ referred to Article 3(g) of the Definition of 
Aggression appended to a resolution of 1974 of the UN General Assembly 
as concerning an “armed attack.”45 The Definition of Aggression can thus be 
used to define the concept of armed attack. Article 2 of this definition states 
that aggression is “…the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State....”46 Article 2 
of the Definition of Aggression also specifies that an act of aggression must 
be of “sufficient gravity.” Similarly, the ICJ has stated that the “most grave 
forms of the use of force” constitute armed attacks.47 Furthermore, for the 
Court, an armed attack must be carried out “…with the specific intention of 
harming” a State – e.g. of harming the vessels of a State.48 Finally, an armed 
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attack must be directed from outside territory controlled by the victim 
State.49 Therefore, an armed attack must correspond to a severe international 
use of armed force with a hostile character. The scope, duration and intensity 
of the armed force must be assessed to determine whether an armed attack 
has occurred. Today, terrorist groups have the capability to perpetrate attacks 
as grave as those of States. The IS for instance has clearly committed attacks 
that have crossed the threshold of armed attacks. In particular, the organization 
has launched full-scale invasions into Iraq and Syria, taking control of 
significant parts of their territory.50 
 The UN Charter and other regional defensive treaties do not envisage 
military defence against attacks committed by non-State actors. On the other 
hand, they do not exclude them. As famously declared by Judge Higgins: 
“[t]here is nothing in the text of Article 51 [UN Charter] that … stipulates 
that self-defence is available only when an armed attack is made by a 
State.”51 Could the State that is victim of an armed attack exercise its right to 
self-defence against a non-State actor, like the IS, author of the attack? The 
ICJ has clearly stated that the Charter only “recognizes the existence of 
an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State 
against another State” (we emphasize).52 In another case, it declined to 
elaborate on whether actions by non-State actors would constitute an armed 
attack that would trigger an armed defensive response.53 The fundamental 
problem here lies in the fact that non-State actors perpetrating armed 
attacks against a State do not normally reside in sovereignty-free areas (like 
in the high sea or in space). Thus, to admit the existence of a right to self-
defence against non-State actors would almost always have an impact on the 
territorial integrity of a State. This would violate Article 2 paragraph 4 of the 
Charter, that also reflects customary international law,54 which prohibits 
the use of armed force against the territorial integrity of States. 
      The law of self-defence is guaranteed under the UN Charter and 
customary international law. In accordance with a traditional interpretation 
of that law, self-defence is resorted to against a State. An interpretation of a 
treaty or a customary international norm can, however, be modified by 
customary international law.55 That law emerges through the combination of 
practice and opinio juris – the feeling that the practice is binding – that are 
repeated over a certain period of time, in a consistent way, and shared by a 
generality of States, including States whose interests are specially affected by 
the practice.56 Did the practice and the belief of States support the emergence 
of a customary right to self-defence against non-State actors? 
      States, in particular the United States and Israel, have sometimes used 
force against non-State actors. Thus, after the attacks of September 11 by the 
al-Qaeda terrorist organization on the American territory, the United States 
and its allied justified their resort to force against al-Qaeda terrorist camps 
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and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan on the basis 
of their right to individual or collective self-defence.57 Al-Qaeda had planned 
its terrorist activities in Afghanistan with the passive support of that State. 
Following the dismantlement of the Taliban regime in December 2001, 
action in self-defence on the part of the United States and its allies was no 
longer directed against the State of Afghanistan, but directly against the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda, then both non-State actors. At least at the beginning, 
the military intervention received a broad international support.58 In 2006, 
Israel took action in self-defence against the Hezbollah organization in 
Lebanon, declaring that it was acting not against the State of Lebanon – to 
which it was not able to attribute Hezbollah’s conduct – but against 
Hezbollah itself, a non-State actor.59 Although many States criticised the 
disproportionate way in which Israel exercised its right to self-defence, they 
agreed as a matter of principle that Israel had a right to self-defence to react 
to the attacks of Hezbollah.60 When, in other precedents, States invoked the 
right to self-defence against non-State actors, in particular terrorist 
organizations, third States were, however, reluctant to recognise the legality 
of the forcible action.61 Thus, in recent State practice, there was not quite a 
general and clear approval of the legality of the right to self-defence against 
non-State actors, even when they acted from a State that supported them or 
that failed to prevent its territory from being used as a base for their attacks. 
It is here argued that a right to self-defence against non-State actors was in 
the process of emerging. However, given the lack of broadness and 
consistency of both State practice and opinio juris, a right to self-defence in 
response to armed attacks by non-State actors had not crystallised in 
customary international law prior to the military intervention against the IS 
in Syria.  
 
2.2. The Allegation of a Right to Self-Defence against the IS  
 
A total of 11 States explicitly invoked a right to self-defence against the IS 
in Syria, namely the United States, Canada, Turkey, Australia, France, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Norway. The exercise of self-defence in Syria, without its explicit consent, 
affects its territorial integrity. Thus, some of the intervening States advanced 
a reason, other than the need to react to armed attacks, to justify entering into 
Syria’s territory.  
      In accordance with the ICJ, every State must not “allow knowingly its 
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”62 States 
have a customary obligation to ensure that the area under their jurisdiction is 
not used in detriment of other States. Therefore, States should prevent their 
territory – or any other area under their exclusive control – to be used as a 
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base for international offensives by terrorist organizations. Security Council 
Resolution 1373 obliges States to “deny safe haven to those who finance, 
plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens....”63 The 
Syrian State does indeed try to prevent the development of international 
terrorist activities by the IS from its territory. It has been locked in an 
internal conflict against the IS for years now, but struggles to put an end to 
its extra-territorial offensive action. The United States, Canada, Australia, 
and Turkey have stated in their letters reporting their action in self-defence 
against the IS in Syria to the UN Security Council, that Syria is “unwilling 
or unable” to prevent attacks emanating from the IS from its territory.64 
Similarly, the British Prime Minister referred to the right to self-defence 
against the IS in Syria and to the fact that “the al-Assad regime is unwilling 
and/or unable to take action necessary to prevent ISIL’s continuing attack on 
Iraq – or indeed an attack on us.”65 Thus, for those States, their right to self-
defence against the IS in Syria is justified for two reasons: first, in reaction 
to ongoing, imminent or even possible armed attacks by the IS; second, 
because Syria, is “unwilling or unable” to prevent the IS from launching 
those attacks from its territory. Here, the justification for the use of the 
right to self-defence lies in the existence of armed attacks by a non-State 
actor and in the unwillingness or inability of the territorial State to address 
those attacks.66 If a closer analysis is done of the consequences of the 
unwillingness or inability of the territorial State, it appears that it exonerates 
the victim State of any responsibility for the incidental breach of the 
territorial State’s sovereignty in the course of self-defence by the victim 
State.67 
      This understanding of the right to self-defence had already been explicitly 
invoked by a few States in the past. For instance, Israel claimed a right to 
self-defence against the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanon, in 
1981, because Lebanon was “unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its 
territory” by that organization to attack Israel.68 In 1996, Turkey asserted 
that it had a right to act in self-defence against Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê 
(PKK) in Iraq because Iraq was “unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its 
territory” for attacks by that group.69 Similarly, in 2002, Russia advanced 
that since Georgia was “unable to establish a security zone in the area of the 
Georgian-Russian border,” and thus to put an end to attacks by non-State 
actors against Russia, it reserved to act in self-defence.70 Reference can also 
be made to declarations of high-ranking US officials who supported the 
unwilling or unable test. The Legal Advisor to the State Department of State, 
under the Bush administration, stated that: “a state must prevent terrorists 
from using its territory as a base for launching attacks. As a legal matter, 
where a state is unwilling or unable to do so, it may be lawful for the 
targeted state to use military force in self-defence to address that threat.”71 
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His successor under the Obama administration shared the same position.72 
Overall however, actions in self-defence against non-State actors launching 
armed attacks, under the justification that the territorial State was unwilling 
or unable to deal with the situation, was received with only little explicit 
support by other States.73 
      As proposed by its proponents, the unwilling or unable test requires the 
victim State itself to assess as accurately as possible whether the territorial 
State is willing or able to address armed attacks committed by a non-State 
actor from within its territory.74 The obligation of a State to prevent its 
territory to be used for the perpetration of armed attacks against other States 
is “an obligation of means, not an obligation of results.”75 Thus, Syria has 
the obligation to do whatever possible in the particular circumstances aiming 
at the suppression of extraterritorial terrorist activities by the IS within its 
territorial confines. At the beginning of the emergence of the IS, Syria was 
not fully committed to defeat this group. There is evidence that the regime of 
al-Assad allowed the IS to establish a safe haven on its territory.76 It is not 
the case anymore. Syria is engaged in a conflict against the IS and thus 
willing to suppress it. Concerning the inability test, it can indeed be argued 
that Syria has proved unable to prevent the IS from using its territory to 
launch international attacks. Syrian troops have withdrawn from many regions 
in Syria and have difficulties in others in the fight against the IS. Syria lacks 
control over large parts of its territory from which the IS operates.77 Syria is 
clearly unable to deal, on its own, with the terrorist organization. It must 
then ask other States for assistance. Otherwise, it would violate its obligation 
of due diligence to prevent armed attacks emanating from its territory.78 
Syria has indeed stated that it wishes to cooperate with the United States and 
other States to combat the IS, but those States do not want to be associated 
with Syria as long as the regime of al-Assad remains in place.79 For instance, 
the United States has said that “[i]n the fight against ISIL, we cannot rely on 
an Assad regime that terrorizes its own people.”80 In this author’s view, the 
offer made by Syria to collaborate with other States in the fight against the 
IS should not be rejected as long as it is given clearly, freely, and by the 
proper government of Syria, regardless of the serious violations of international 
law committed by that government. The Syrian State should be regarded as 
willing to address the IS’s armed attacks, as long as it expresses its consent, 
through its government, to control the organisation in cooperation with other 
State(s).  
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3. An Action in Self-Defence in Reaction  
    to Future Armed Attacks by the IS 
 
3.1. The Allegation of a Right to Anticipatory Self-Defence against the IS 
 
Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, an armed attack must “occur” to justify 
a response in self-defence.81 The action in self-defence must be reported to 
the UN Security Council that shall take measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. What is contemplated by the Charter is that 
States have the right to respond to an armed attack only for the period that it 
takes for the Security Council to be notified, and for the necessary action to 
be taken to restore international peace and security.  
      Another temporal interpretation of the right to self-defence argues that 
such a right exists in an anticipatory way, to prevent an armed attack that is 
about to commence. The right to anticipatory self-defence departs from the 
text of Article 51 of the UN Charter but could have emerged in customary 
international law since the drafting of the Charter.82 Most academics, including 
the present author, consider that it would be unrealistic to expect a State, 
which detects preparations of an armed attack, to wait until this attack finally 
takes place.83 Whether an armed attack may be regarded as imminent, should 
be determined by reference to all relevant circumstances. In order to assess 
the imminence, as many academics frequently do, resort can be made to the 
criteria used by the American Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the 
Caroline case.84 He stated that preventive action by a foreign State is con- 
fined to cases in which the necessity of that self-defence is “instant, over- 
whelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”85  
      In practice, the Caroline criteria are rarely literally applied. States resort 
to anticipatory self-defence not only to react to an impending armed attack 
that will be initiated within minutes or hours but also to avert an armed 
attack, when there is a credible certainty that it will be launched in the 
foreseeable future.86 They had a broad interpretation of the imminence of an 
armed attack. For instance, the military intervention in Afghanistan in 
October 2001 intended to halt further terrorist attacks from the al-Qaeda 
organization, and not attacks that were about to materialise. The United 
States explained that its action was “designed to prevent and deter further 
attacks on the United States.”87 Similarly, the United Kingdom argued that 
its participation in collective self-defence in the military operation was “to 
avert the continuing threat of attacks.”88 Overall, States have expressed 
different views on the legality of a right to self-defence in reaction to armed 
attacks that are very likely to occur in an immediate future.89 It is here 
argued that the right to self-defence in reaction to a future armed attack that 
is not sure to happen, was not sufficiently supported by State practice and 
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opinio juris, and had not crystallised in customary international law before 
the conflict in Syria.90  
      A broad understanding of the concept of armed attack is shared by some 
of the States militarily involved against the IS in Syria. Turkey launched its 
first airstrikes against the IS in Syria in July 2015, referring to its right to 
individual and collective self-defence. It then relied on the existence of a 
“clear and imminent threat of continuing attack from Daesh” (we emphasize) 
and not in the existence of a clearly imminent attack.91 The United Kingdom 
also adopted a quite extensive understanding of the condition of imminence 
in the exercise of the right to anticipatory self-defence. It killed two British 
citizens in a drone strike in Syria in August 2015, arguing that it was acting 
under the right to individual self-defence against the IS. One of the individuals 
killed was, as stated by the United Kingdom, “engaged in planning and 
directing imminent armed attacks against the United Kingdom” (we 
emphasize).92 The United Kingdom thus only referred to prospective attacks 
and not to attacks that were about to be perpetrated. France reacted similarly. 
France extended its strikes against the IS in Syria after the Paris and Saint-
Denis attacks of 13th November 2015. The attackers were not under direct 
instructions from the IS’s commanders. The IS however acknowledged and 
adopted the French attacks as its own. The Paris and Saint-Denis terrorist 
acts can thus be attributed to that organization.93 Those attacks that killed 
130 and seriously injured 413 people can be seen as reaching the level of an 
armed attack.94 It was thought that the IS would commit or acknowledge 
other attacks – a fear confirmed with the terrorist attack in Nice on 14 July 
that killed 86 people and was acknowledged by the IS.95 When France began 
its action in individual self-defence against the IS in Syria in November 
2015, it was however unclear whether the group was about to launch armed 
attacks against France. France then reacted to armed attacks that were not in 
the process of being committed. Thus, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and 
France resorted to their right to individual self-defence in reaction to armed 
attacks by the IS that were not about to happen, but were, at best, very likely 
to occur. 
 
3.2. The Allegation of a Right to Pre-emptive Self-Defence against the IS 
 
Following the attacks of 11th September 2001, the United States adopted 
another, third temporal conception of the right to self-defence, where the 
armed attack is in a further distance than in the right to anticipatory self-
defence. The United States asserted that it had a right to pre-emptive self-
defence to react to potential armed attacks that if they took place would 
result in significant harm. The United States invoked in particular a right to 
pre-emptive self-defence against States developing weapons of mass destruc- 
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tion, which they might use themselves against the United States or supply to 
terrorist organizations hostile to that State.96 The Bush administration claimed 
a right to use force before attacks occur, “even if uncertainty remains as to 
the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”97 It argued that circumstances had 
changed and the requirement of imminent attack should be adapted to the 
capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.98 The current Obama 
administration did not seem to have departed from the pre-emptive self-
defence argument.99 Thus, the United States attempted to shift the parameters 
of immediacy and imminence of an armed attack to deal with a threat of an 
armed attack that could manifest itself at some point in the future. The 
notion of pre-emptive self-defence precludes any attempt to assess self-
defence claims objectively, instead giving to States the discretionary power 
to decide whether an uncertain future threat for their security justifies a 
resort to force. The pre-emptive self-defence doctrine, which would result 
both in a total redefinition of the concept of self-defence and the replacement 
of the present international law on the use of force, was not shared by other 
States and had thus not become customary before the beginning of the 
conflict against the IS.100  
      An extensive temporal conception of the right to self-defence has, 
however, been recently adopted by some States in their military action against 
the IS. The United States had not been victim of an armed attack by the IS – 
an assault on a small number of captured Americans in Iraq and Syria cannot 
be considered to be an armed attack against the United States101 – when it 
began its self-defence intervention against the IS in Syria.102 Nevertheless, 
the United States claimed a right to individual self-defence against the IS. It 
stated that the IS and other terrorist groups were a “threat” to the United 
States triggering the right of countries, including the United States, to defend 
themselves “in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective 
self-defence.”103 The United States did not produce information about concrete 
preparations of an armed attack by that organisation against the country in a 
near future. Future attacks by the IS did not appear to be imminent, but 
looked like mere speculations. Similarly, the United States reported that it 
initiated a military intervention against elements of the Khorasan Group in 
Syria, on the basis of its right to individual self-defence, “to address terrorist 
threats that they pose to the United States and our partners and allies” (we 
emphasize).104 Again, United States officials did not provide any evidence of 
an imminent armed attack by the Khorasan Group. Like the United States, 
Canada has not been attacked by the IS.105 Canada relied however on its 
right to individual self-defence against the IS in Syria. It declared that “ISIL 
also continues to pose a threat not only to Iraq, but also to Canada and 
Canadians.... In accordance with the inherent rights of individual and 
collective self-defence reflected in Article 51 of the UN Charter, States must 
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be able to act in self-defence...” (we emphasize).106 Canada did not give any 
precision concerning the imminence of an armed attack by the IS against that 
State. Like the United States and Canada, the United Kingdom has not been 
attacked by the IS.107 It also claimed a right to individual self-defence to 
react to only a threat of armed attacks perpetrated by the IS. The British 
Prime Minister referred to the threat posed by the IS to the United Kingdom 
and to seven terrorist plots to attack the country that were linked to the IS or 
inspired by its propaganda – therefore not all directed by that organization.108 
In its letter reporting its action in self-defence in Syria, the United Kingdom 
explained that “ISIL/ Daesh members are known to be actively engaged in 
planning and directing attacks against the United Kingdom from Syria” (we 
emphasize).109 The United Kingdom did not however provide evidence that 
an armed attack by the IS was imminent. Thus, the United States, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom asserted a right to self-defence in order to react to a 
simple threat of armed attacks by the IS and not to occurring or imminent 
armed attacks.  
 
4. The Limited International Acceptance  
    of a Broad Right to Self-Defence in Syria 
 
Before the fight against the IS in Syria, State practice and opinio juris 
revealed the emergence of a new interpretation of the right to self-defence, 
allowing the use of that right against non-State actors.110 Did the allegation 
of some of the intervening States in Syria in favour of a right to self-defence 
against the IS, a non-State actor, crystallise the right to self-defence against 
non-State actors in customary international law? Furthermore, some of the 
States involved in the US-led military coalition in Syria asserted the existence 
of a right to self-defence in reaction to future armed attacks by the IS. Did the 
military intervention in Syria lead to the emergence, in customary international 
law, of a right to anticipatory self-defence in response to very credible armed 
attacks, or even a right to pre-emptive self-defence in response to possible 
armed attacks?  
      As stated above in that article, 11 States explicitly referred to the right to 
self-defence to justify their military involvement against the IS in Syria.111 
Among them, 5 States explicitly shared the unwilling and unable standard: the 
United States, Canada, Australia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.112 5 
States had a wide perception of the temporal requirement of the right to self-
defence, asserting it to react to imminent armed attacks – the imminence 
being broadly understood – or even to a simple threat of armed attacks: 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and Canada.113 The 
allegation of a right to self-defence against the IS by 11 States, even if 
including powerful States, cannot however, on its own, crystallise a new 
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interpretation of the right to self-defence. Such a new interpretation should 
be clearly supported by a majority of the international community. 
      It can first be looked at the reactions of international organizations 
towards the self-defence action against the IS in Syria. For the UN Security 
Council, “Member States that have the capacity to do so” are called upon “to 
take all necessary measures” in order to eradicate the safe havens those 
terrorist groups have established over Iraq and Syria.114 The term “capacity” 
is to interpret in an encompassing way. Resolution 2249 asks all UN Member 
States to take any kind of measure in the fight against the IS. This includes 
non-forcible measures as well as military measures. Although Resolution 
2249 does not authorize the use of armed force, it encourages it. The 
Security Council was of course aware that the legal argument of most States 
militarily involved in Syria was the right to self-defence. Thus, the Security 
Council can be seen as supporting, but only implicitly, the right to self-
defence against the IS, a non-State actor, including in a preventive way. 
Similarly, the Council of the European Union implicitly endorsed the self-
defence justification for the military operation in Syria, when it activated the 
Mutual Defence clause in November 2015, after the Paris and Saint-Denis 
attacks. It then stated: “if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression 
on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation 
of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with 
Article 51 of the UN Charter.”115 Thus, both the UN Security Council and 
the Council of the European Union seem to approve the action in self-
defence against the IS in Syria, but only very cautiously.  
      The paper now turns to the reactions of States towards the self-defence 
intervention against the IS in Syria. 5 States participating in the military 
action in Syria did not articulate any legal justification for their participation, 
be it self-defence or other: Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates.116 This suggests that they are not ready to support the 
right to self-defence against the IS. Other States contested the legality of 
the military intervention in Syria, and thus rejected the existence of a right 
to self-defence against the IS. Syria objected to the legality of the use of 
force against the IS within its territorial confines, if done without its 
consent.117 Russia condemned American airstrikes on the IS in Syria.118 Iran 
stated that the American intervention in Syria was illegal.119 As allies of the 
al-Assad regime, Russia and Iran are indeed opposed to the use of force on 
Syrian territory without the agreement of the Syrian government. Some 
States, more generally, condemned any infringement of the sovereignty of a 
State, including that of Syria, even in the fight against the IS.120  
      The vast majority of the States not involved in the military operation in 
Syria has neither condemned nor supported it.121 They did not express any 
opinion on the legality of the action in self-defence. Could it be argued that 
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the silence of a high majority of States not involved in the self-defence 
intervention against the IS in Syria towards the legality of that intervention, 
reflect an implicit acceptance of that legality? The role of silence or 
abstention could reveal the approval of a new customary practice only in the 
situation where States were conscious that they should object to the practice 
in order to prevent its emergence as a customary practice. This is a reasonable 
precaution, since a State may simply do nothing and mean nothing by it.122 It 
is doubtful whether States believed that their silence towards the legality of 
the action in self-defence against the IS in Syria could be interpreted as an 
acquiescence of that legality, especially concerning the legality of a practice 
related to the use of armed force. The prohibition of the resort to force by a 
State in another State without the explicit consent of the latter State is a 
norm of a higher legal value under international law, a peremptory norm of 
international law from which no derogation is possible in any international 
act.123 Given the legal importance of the prohibition on the use of force by a 
State on the territory of another State, it is here argued that a customary 
exception from it or the extension of an exception from it could emerge only 
if it is supported by an explicit opinio juris. Thus, States did very likely not 
want to support a broad right to self-defense, allowing the use of force by a 
State on the territory of another State in reaction to occurring or future armed 
attacks by a local non-State actor, when those States did not explicitly object 
to the recourse to force against the IS on the territory of Syria. The absence 
of explicit criticisms of many States towards the action in self-defence 
against the IS in Syria should not be regarded as revealing an opinio juris in 
favour of a new right to self-defence against a non-State actor or a new right 
to self-defence in reaction to future armed attacks.124 Furthermore, although 
64 States and 2 regional organizations contribute in various capacities to the 
effort to combat the IS in Iraq, only 16 States participate in different ways in 
the military action against the IS in Syria. It is here submitted that the high 
difference in the number of States involved in the combat against the same 
non-State actor in Iraq and Syria is indicative of States’ concerns as to the 
legality of the use of force in self-defence against the IS in Syria.  
      An instructive comparison can be made with the international support of 
the self-defence action against the al-Qaeda organization and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan in 2001. After the September 11 attacks, in Resolutions 1368 
and 1373, the UN Security Council condemned those attacks and recognized 
or reaffirmed “the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence in 
accordance with the Charter.”125 The Security Council did not make express 
reference to an “armed attack” but instead to a “threat to international peace 
and security.” However, on the other hand, the Security Council does not 
often explicitly refer to the right to self-defence. Thus, the inclusion of self-
defence in Resolutions 1368 and 1373 is significant and can be interpreted as 
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an approval of the self-defence intervention in Afghanistan. On 12th September 
2001, the North Atlantic Council agreed that the attacks against the United 
States “shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Wash- 
ington Treaty,” which states that an armed attack against one or more of the 
Allies in Europe or North America is an attack against them all.126 The North 
Atlantic Council thus recognised the legality of a collective self-defence 
reaction in Afghanistan. The Organization of American States also expressed 
support for the right to collective self-defence after the terrorist attacks.127 
Furthermore, the military intervention in self-defence by the United States in 
Afghanistan, that begun on 7 October 2001, got the military assistance of the 
UK and pledges of military support from other States on the basis of their 
right to collective self-defence.128 In addition, the military defensive action 
in Afghanistan was received with several declarations of acceptance by other 
numerous States.129  
      The self-defence operation against the IS in Syria was not supported at 
the same level as the self-defence operation against al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
in Afghanistan. No international organizations have expressed explicit 
approval for the right to self-defence against the IS in Syria. Similarly, there 
were not numerous public assertions of support for that right. On the 
contrary, as seen above in that chapter, some States denounced the illegality 
of the unilateral military action in Syria.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The involvement of States and international organizations in the airstrikes 
against the IS in Syria is relatively weak, in particular in comparison to 
the involvement in the airstrikes against the same terrorist group in Iraq. 
Furthermore, the international community did not clearly support the 
allegation made by some of the intervening States in Syria of the existence 
of a right to self-defence against the IS as a non-State actor, or a right to self-
defence in response to future armed attacks by the IS. Therefore, it is here 
concluded that the military intervention against the IS in Syria did not lead to 
a crystallisation of a customary right to self-defence against a non-State actor 
or a customary right to anticipatory self-defence – in reaction to armed 
attacks that are very likely to happen – or pre-emptive self-defence – in 
reaction to a threat of armed attacks. Under current international law, there is 
not yet a right to self-defence against a non-State actor, even in a State that is 
not able or not willing to deal with the non-State actor. Similarly, there is not 
a right to self-defence in response to very likely armed attacks or, a fortiori, 
in response to only possible armed attacks. The fight against the IS has not 
broadened up the right to self-defence under customary international law. 
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      This fight constitutes however another precedent towards the emergence 
of a customary right to self-defence against non-State actors, including 
as a reaction to future armed attacks. If the right to self-defence against non-
State actors finally crystallises, States should be careful in not broadening by 
too much its material and temporal scopes. Action in self-defence against 
non-State actors should be restricted to a few exceptional cases, when it 
appears to be really necessary. Furthermore, the moment as to when the right 
to self-defence could be legally exercised should not be too expanded. 
In this author’s view, the temporal requirement of the right to self-defence 
should be interpreted with some flexibility when self-defence applies to non-
State actors, especially terrorist organizations, whose attacks inherently 
rely on unpredictability and concealment. Implementation of the right 
to self-defence should however be restricted to situations where there is 
persuasive evidence of a concrete armed attack in the foreseeable future.  
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